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February 24, 2023

Volume 3

Issue 4

What's Been Happening

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National Economic Security Legislation and Regulation Grinds On

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In One Sentence

  • U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said that a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is “a matter of economic security for the entire world,” likening it to the Ukraine crisis. 
  • The Biden administration is working with Congress to “expand [the] toolbox on economic coercion.”
  • The United States’ trade in goods with China reached US$680.7 billion in 2022—the highest on record.

Mark the Essentials

  • The U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce jointly launched a “Disruptive Technology Strike Force” to investigate and prosecute criminal violations of export laws and export controls with an aim to protect U.S. advanced technologies from “nation-state adversaries.”
  • In a recent report, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Democrats urged the Biden administration to allocate more resources to advance U.S. diplomacy and development interests in the Indo-Pacific and counter China’s influence in the region. The report also called on the administration to “actively cultivate Congress as a partner.”
  • Senators Todd Young and Chris Coons reintroduced an updated version of the Countering Economic Coercion Act, which would enable the President to increase tariffs against “foreign adversaries” committing economic coercion and support trading partners targeted by coercion through lowered tariffs or aid.
  • House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Michael McCaul and Appropriations Committee ranking member Rosa DeLauro jointly called on President Biden to take “immediate action” and screen outbound investments to China.

Keeping an Eye On…

  • It is now approaching almost five years since the U.S. Congress enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and, in the process, inaugurated an active period of legislation and regulation related to national economic security. FIRRMA was followed by the all-encompassing Information and Communications Technology and Services Executive Order (ICTS EO) in May 2019, which provided the basis for the export controls clampdown on Huawei. These controls were dramatically expanded to the entire Chinese advanced computing and semiconductor ecosystem in the Commerce Department’s October 2022 Advanced Computing and Semiconductors Rule. Relatedly, protections against China’s collection and exploitation of sensitive data of U.S. persons was enumerated in the Biden administration’s Connected Software EO in June 2021, and implemented in November 2021. Mitigation measures against perceived security risks have been presented more recently to TikTok, the viral video app, by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). During these five years, a number of Chinese economic actors, both state-owned and private, have also been dumped into a plethora of lists—ranging from the Entities List, the Unverified List, the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies (CMIC) List, and the Military End User List (although none was dropped into the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List). This intensified legislative and regulatory focus on national economic security will persist in 2023. The Treasury and Commerce Departments are due to submit their 2023 Omnibus Bill-mandated reports on their respective “role in the establishment of a program to address the national security threats emanating from outbound investments [to the PRC]” by February 27th. Also, the Deputy Attorney General’s recent remarks on “disruptive technologies” suggests that a White House Executive Order on an outbound investment screening mechanism may be in the offing. Meantime, from a trade policy standpoint, bills to expand the toolkit of options to counter China’s ‘economic coercion’ have been introduced in both chambers of Congress. Corresponding European Union-wide legislation is at the ‘trilogue’ stage featuring advanced deliberations between the European Commission, Council and Parliament. The EU’s anti-coercion instrument-related deliberations follow in the wake of its Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, its toolbox of 5G-related mitigation measures, as well as its recently passed Foreign Subsidies Regulation. Clearly, the active spell of legislation and regulation on national economic security on both sides of the Atlantic with a focus on China continues, and will remain an important feature of the international economic landscape in 2023. 

Expanded Reading

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U.S. Trade and Tech Revamp Chugs Along, Allies Role Uncertain

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In One Sentence

  • A U.S. trade official noted that most existing U.S. trade agreements fail to address supply chain resiliency concerns.
  • The White House highlighted the need to build data sharing mechanisms with allies and the private sector while addressing the “supply chain crisis.”
  • In defense of its commitment to ensure “robust cross-border data flows,” the Biden administration noted that the approach will also align with a worker-centric trade policy. 
  • The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) aims to ensure that the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework’s (IPEF) sustainability initiative does not create more non-tariff trade barriers.

Mark the Essentials

  • During the third round of meetings of the U.S.-Japan Partnership on Trade, the two sides discussed plans for a task force on human rights and labor standards, coordination efforts to respond to “third-country regulations” of concern with regard to the digital economy, as well as Japan’s concerns on the Inflation Reduction Act’s electric vehicle tax credit requirements. 
  • According to former Assistant USTR Dan Mullaney, the United States and the European Union have shared goals and overlapping interests in areas such as addressing non-market economy policies and avoiding inconsistent regulation and standards to facilitate trade, but must get specific on the exact policies and standards if concrete progress is to be made within the US-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). 
  • Both the U.S. and the EU plan to work on shared standards in electric vehicles (EV) and explore ways in which digital technologies can be used to facilitate trade at the next meeting of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). On February 15th however, the Biden administration independently released its own EV charging standards and mandated that, come July 2024, 55% of the cost of EV charging equipment funded through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law must feature domestically manufactured components.     
  • Canadian Ministers Anita Anand and François-Philippe Champagne said that Canada could play a “unique” role as the U.S. strengthens economic and supply chain resiliency, pointing to Canada’s traditional exemption from ‘Buy America’ rules, North America’s coordination with regard to semiconductor manufacturing, and Canada’s abundant critical mineral resources. 

Keeping an Eye On…

  • A U.S. trade official noted that most existing U.S. trade agreements fail to address supply chain resiliency concerns. This official is correct. U.S. trade agreements are meant to facilitate market access-based reciprocal trade liberalization; they are not intended to facilitate trade diversion by way of ‘friendshoring’, be it in the name of supply chain resiliency or ‘worker-centric’ protectionism. More fundamentally, the race to ‘friendshore’ stands in polar contrast to the existing practice of multilateral liberalization. The latter is predicated on the ‘most favored nation’ (MFN) clause, i.e., extending the same trade terms to all trading partners; the latter rests on selective preferences exchanged among friends utilizing skewed rules of origin. And although free trade agreements are an exception to the MFN principle and discriminate between insiders and outsiders, the most recent ‘friendshoring’ pact—the US, Mexico, Canada Agreement (USMCA)—was the first such agreement to actually raise barriers. Expect the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) to more-or-less follow in this vein. Is it any surprise, then, that USTR continues to resolutely stand against constructive reform of the WTO’s dispute settlement function? And that the national security exception has been turned into a defense of first and last recourse at the WTO by USTR? A ‘friendshored’ trading order stands in contrast to—and in violation of—key principles of the postwar-rules based trading system. And in which case, a number of ‘friendshoring’ provisions will be found to be in violation of these trade rules; the national security defense claim notwithstanding. 
  • Going forward, the operative question is not so much whether Washington will make an about-face and embrace conventional or MFN means of trade liberalization. Rather, the question is whether, and the extent to which, other countries in Washington’s orbit will choose to restrain themselves from partaking in the benefits of ‘friendshored’ trade and investment policy measures that are clearly inconsistent with WTO rules. Judging by the European Union’s oscillating response to the vast sums shoveled out in the Biden administration’s WTO non-compliant Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the pragmatic temptation to cut side deals and enter the charmed circle of subsidized friends is likely to be far more powerful than ideologically standing up in solitary defense of global rules. That said, that which is individually beneficial could yet at the aggregate level come to haunt the trading order systemically. The rules-based international trading system stands at an important inflection moment. And America’s allies have an important role to play in helping to preserve that order. Deepening WTO-complaint trading arrangements with all interested parties on a non-bloc basis should remain an essential component of their toolkit. 

Expanded Reading

On the Hill

Legislative Development

  • House Homeland Security Committee Chair Mark Green re-introduced a bill that will use revenues from tariffs on Chinese goods to “near-shore” manufacturing from China to the Latin America-Caribbean region.
  • Senators Todd Young and Chris Coons reintroduced a bill to “equip the president with new tools” to “counter economic coercion of allies and partners” by “countries like China and Russia.”

Hearings and Statements

  • Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden, joined by ranking member Mike Crapo and other committee members, committed to improve U.S. trade laws, modernize trade law enforcement, and expand the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)’s toolbox to address “trade cheats in China and around the world” that “evade U.S. trade laws.”
  • Calling for “bold, impactful trade agreements,” Senate Finance Committee ranking member Mike Crapo said Congress will “step up and in a bipartisan fashion” if the administration continues to “take a timeout on trade.”
  • House China Committee member Andy Kim said he would “push” for conversations on the economy, trade and innovation at the China Committee in addition to military, security and deterrence concerns related to Taiwan.
  • House China Committee ranking member Raja Krishnamoorthi committed to “counteract the CCP’s escalating aggression,” including “its threats against Taiwan’s democracy, its weaponization of TikTok, and its theft of…American intellectual property.”
  • The House China Committee has picked former staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence David Hanke as the committee’s chief of staff and former chief Republican counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s privacy, technology and the law subcommittee Julissa Walsh as the committee’s general counsel.

Expanded Reading