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WASHINGTON, DC – FEBRUARY 7: U.S. President Joe Biden addresses a joint session of Congress (Source: United States House of Representatives/House Creative Service, public domain)
Research Associate
Part-Time Research Assistant
In May 2023, the team at the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS) launched the U.S.-China Legislative and Executive Actions Directory (L.E.A.D.) Project to track and summarize trending critical issues and developments on China, emanating from both the White House and Capitol Hill.
This is the first release of the Legislative Actions Directory.
When the 118th Congress convened on January 3, 2023, there was solid bipartisan consensus in Congress and in Washington to primarily view the U.S.-China relationship through the lens of strategic competition. Despite the fact that the Biden administration’s approach on China has been through multiple phases of development, the eventual framework of “invest, align, and compete” defined the general trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship. The 118th Congress has inherited where the 117th Congress ended on China—with the then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visiting Taiwan and stirring up an intensive bilateral diplomatic and security showdown as well as the passage of the “China competition bill,” formally referred to as the Strategic Competition Act of 2021. Therefore, the 118th Congress wasted no time beginning their search to develop America’s new approach to outcompete China.
Within this consensus to outcompete China, congressional leadership encouraged many lawmakers to not only make China a legislative priority, but also to look beyond the traditional areas and typical means to enhance American leadership. Soon after the midterm election, held in November 2022, then-Minority Leader, now-Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy announced plans to establish a special committee on China, calling for and successfully receiving bipartisan support to prioritize China as a long-term challenge of American leadership and interests. In the Senate, key lawmakers in both parties similarly highlighted the U.S.-China strategic competition and named China as a legislative priority. Notably, the strategic competition with China has become a rare case of bipartisan and bicameral unison at a time when lawmakers regularly clash over other issues such as debts and budgets.
This rise in attention is evident from a numerical standpoint alone. From January to April 2023, the 118th Congress introduced more than 250 bills related to China; a clear increase compared to the 130 introduced over the first four months of the 117th Congress. With a shared understanding of China’s importance and Congress’ strategic objective on China, lawmakers have been more active than ever on issues ranging from trade, national security and sanctions to human rights, democratic values, Taiwan, and China’s global influence.
When compiled and compared, these 250+ bills proposed over the first four months of the 118th Congress show nine identifiable trends in the new Congress’ initial legislative actions related to China:
[Click to View a Full List of Notable China-Related Bills, January-April 2023]
Among the dozens of China-related bills that have gathered considerable attention, deliberation and momentum on Capitol Hill, more than half primarily concern issues and problems of economic nature. For example, S.866 American Innovation and Jobs Act, proposed by Senator Margaret Wood Hassan on March 16, 2023, aims to ensure U.S. competitiveness with “international rivals, most notably China” by providing research and development tax credits to startups and small businesses in the United States. S.686 Risk Information and Communications Technology (RESTRICT) Act, on the other hand, directly addresses U.S. business transactions with Chinese companies and aims to defend U.S. economic and national security interests from mergers, acquisitions and business partnerships related to China and emerging technologies, especially information technology.
Given that the U.S. and China had developed broad and in-depth ties in trade and investment since they normalized diplomatic relationship in 1979, the 118th Congress has identified a number of policy objectives to reorient the bilateral economic engagements to better facilitate America’s strategic competition with China. Specifically, lawmakers have sought ways to adjust long-term U.S. economic strategy concerning China, reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese imports, reduce reliance of U.S. exports on the Chinese market, manage U.S. investments to China, and prevent U.S. resources from unfairly benefitting China.
Accordingly, lawmakers called for a coordinated approach on strategy-making both with regard to China and with regard to American trade policy. On March 16, 2023, Senator Angus King and Tim Kaine reintroduced S.863, a bill to establish a two-year commission to develop a “grand strategy” on China. According to the bill’s sponsors, the goal is to develop a “comprehensive whole-of-government approach for how the United States should address the economic, security, and diplomatic challenges posed by China”—and hence economic issues are listed as a top priority. On March 23, 2023, Senators James Lankford and Bob Menendez introduced S.958 American Economic Diplomacy Act. This act would require the administration to ensure that its annual trade agenda reflects and advances American foreign policy and national security objectives; in other words, the Annual Trade Agenda should align with the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. When giving examples of what the U.S. trade policy should address after taking foreign policy and national security into consideration, the Senators listed “reducing our reliance on China for critical supply chains” as the second among key focuses.
With regard to specific policy objectives, the 118th Congress has first sought to reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese imports. Under this general goal, lawmakers have placed equal emphasis on traditional grievances towards the U.S.-China trade as well as specific and relatively recent concerns about supply chain resilience. On the one hand, the United States’ traditional grievances of trade deficit and “unfair practices” continue to attract congressional attention. In the first hearing of the House China Committee on February 28, 2023, Scott Paul, President of the Alliance for American Manufacturing and one of the four witnesses to testify, highlighted the surge of trade deficit with China from 2002 to 2018 and linked them directly to “U.S. job losses” on a slide show. Previously on December 20, 2022, now-China Committee member and Democratic lawmaker Ro Khanna also attributed the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs to “the widening U.S. trade deficit.” In accordance with these concerns, multiple legislations have been proposed to increase punitive tariffs against Chinese imports to achieve “fair trade with China.” Representing one of the most radical proposals, S.125/H.R.638 China Trade Relations Act of 2023, proposed in late January by Republican Senators Tom Cotton, Rick Scott, Ted Budd and J.D. Vance and Republican Rep. Christopher Smith, would “strip China of its Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status” and require annual presidential approval before China could obtain Most Favored Nation status during that year. Onto the more specific policy grievance of China’s subsidies, S.153 Fair Trade with China Enforcement Act, a bill that Senator Marco Rubio introduced in May 2018, March 2021 and reintroduced under this Congress on January 31, 2023, includes provisions to expedite processes where U.S. agencies could impose tariffs on Chinese goods “to offset a subsidy” by the Chinese government. Additionally, noting China’s “long history of violating trade agreements with the United States,” Senator Sherrod Brown also proposed S.805 Fighting Trade Cheats Act of 2023 to counter “circumvention” of U.S. tariffs by increasing penalties for those found to violate U.S. trade codes.
Meanwhile, another set of legislations seek to develop better alternatives sources of goods either domestically or in nearby or friendly regions. For example, S.99/H.R.514 National Development Strategy and Coordination Act of 2023, reintroduced by Senator Marco Rubio and Rep. Ro Khanna on January 26, 2023, sought to address “misguided offshoring to countries like China” and “rebuild” the American industrial base by “supercharging” domestic manufacturing by federal loans, investment, financing and other government incentives. Alternatively, Republican lawmaker Mark Green proposed H.R.722 Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act on February 1, 2023. Noting “nearshoring” as “one policy that has been gaining traction” to respond to “the economic challenge of China’s manufacturing dominance,” Rep. Green would use tariff revenues on Chinese goods to incentivize companies to relocate manufacturing from China to Latin American countries.
On the other hand, lawmakers have also sought to address the more recent concerns about the United States’ overreliance on China in key supply chain areas, which they fear would give Beijing an upper hand in the bilateral competition. These areas include strategically critical sectors or economically significant sectors such as solar, shipping and renewable energy. Concerning the United States’ overreliance on solar panels manufactured in China, resolutions were proposed in both House and Senate disapproving the Biden administration’s decision to suspend tariffs on solar imports from four Southeast Asian countries that are allegedly involved in helping Chinese manufacturers “circumvent” U.S. tariffs. According to lawmakers in support of the resolutions, the decision to suspend solar tariffs from these countries, although temporary, would harm U.S. solar manufacturers and introduce, rather than mitigate, extra vulnerabilities as the administration pursues the transition to cleaner energy. Concerning ocean shipping and relevant supply chain issues, Reps. Dusty Johnson and John Garamendi, sponsors of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act that became law in June 2022, introduced H.R.1836 Ocean Shipping Reform Implementation Act to build on the work and further “crack down on the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to influence America’s supply chain.” Among other notes, this act would give the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) expanded authority to investigate and “preempt improper business practices” of “foreign shipping exchanges.” The bill would also prohibit U.S. ports from using Chinese state-sponsored LOGINK software and authorize the FMC to streamline data standards for maritime freight logistics. Legislative proposals have also been made in distinct areas of vulnerabilities such as renewable energy production apart from solar panels. H.R.1448 DARE Act of 2023 would prohibit China and Chinese companies from accessing American land and real estate suitable for renewable energy production. On sourcing critical minerals that are essential for renewable energy production, H.R.1704 Latin America and Caribbean Nearshoring Act by Rep. Mark Green would address U.S. reliance for critical minerals from China by seeking, incentivizing and developing alternative suppliers in Latin American and Caribbean countries through the efforts of the U.S. Department of State and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Addressing both existing and unanticipated critical sector issues through a preemptive, whole-of-government approach, S.99/H.R.514 National Development Strategy and Coordination Act of 2023 would establish a cabinet-level interagency committee, chaired by the Secretary of Treasury to conduct annual reviews to identify and address supply chain vulnerabilities in industries critical to national security of the United States.
In addition to reducing reliance on Chinese imports, lawmakers are also seeking to expand U.S. exports to emerging markets while reducing reliance on the Chinese market. As such, key focus has been placed on opening up new markets and new market opportunities for American businesses. Many Republican lawmakers, in particular, have again repeated their calls for the Biden administration to expand trade and investment ties in promising industries and with “emerging economic leaders.” Identifying digital trade as “the new frontier in economic strength,” S.Res.155/H.Res.270 Resolution to Promote the U.S. Digital Economy and Digital Trade expresses the “sense of the Senate” that the U.S. should negotiate new agreements and explore market access opportunities on digital trade and digital economy. On more region-specific proposals, S.367 Economic and Commercial Opportunities and Networks Act (ECON Act), re-introduced by Senator Jim Risch on February 9, 2023, demands that the Biden administration reduce trade barriers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands through coordinated economic and commercial diplomacy. To ensure that American competitiveness and American interests are protected in these new markets, the bills also introduced a few guardrails. For example, the resolution on digital trade highlights the need to “shape regional norms” as “an alternative to restrictive policies promoted by our adversaries like China,” while the ECON Act includes provisions that combat anti-competitive behavior, prevent forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft and amend U.S. antitrust laws to go after predatory state-owned enterprises that harm U.S. companies.
Furthermore, Congress is also considering closer monitoring and management of U.S. investment to China. On the one hand, there are concerns that U.S. investment to China can create national security risks by providing support and resources to the Chinese government. For example, in introducing H.R.499 Securing American Families and Enterprises (SAFE) from PRC Investments Act, Rep. Pat Fallon aims to ensure that “American investors do not directly aid the Communist Party of China’s military modernization, state surveillance, and human rights abuses.” On a more general term, Senator Rick Scott has “strongly advocate[d] for all American investors and business leaders to cut ties with Communist China.” As a first step to address the concerns, bills such as H.R. 499 and Senator Scott’s S.852 STOP CCP Act of 2023 require public companies and exchange-traded funds to disclose whether they invest in companies with ties to China, Chinese surveillance technology company and those considered to be part of China’s military-industrial complex. At the same time, advocating for the establishment of a more restrictive and enforceable investment review and screening mechanism, H.R.3136 National Critical Capabilities Defense Act of 2023, an updated version of the outbound investment screening bill under the previous Congress, aims to review and mitigate when necessary outbound investment in “national critical capabilities sectors.” These sectors include the semiconductor, large-capacity batteries, critical minerals, artificial intelligence, quantum information science, active pharmaceutical ingredients and automobile manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, some lawmakers have centered their concerns at the financial risks that are specifically associated with investment to China. For example, S.970 Documenting Adversarial Trade Aggression Act (DATA) Act, reintroduced by U.S. Senators Roger Wicker and Catherine Cortez Masto, proposes to establish a China Economic Data Coordination Center within the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the Department of Commerce as “a one-stop shop” to consolidate data on China’s financial and investment risks. More specifically, Senator Rick Scott’s S.864 TASK Act also requires transparency among public companies on “the risks associated with products linked to Xinjiang.”
Finally, given the many new and proposed policy incentives and benefits for U.S. trade, investment and economies, lawmakers also hope to ensure that these governmental support and U.S. technology unduly benefit Chinese companies and industries. Within larger bills, specific ‘guardrail’ provisions could be introduced to preemptively control the flow of government funding and U.S. technology. S.99 National Development Strategy and Coordination Act, for example, prohibits recipients of federal funds from expanding operations in China or transferring intellectual property to Chinese entities. S.367 Economic and Commercial Opportunities and Networks Act (ECON Act) also includes provisions intending to prevent forced technology transfer and intellectual property theft. Alternatively, some lawmakers seek to address all relevant issues through a single bill. Introduced by Rep. Anna Eshoo, H.R.752 Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains Act requires administrative coordination to ensure that federal funding and incentive programs for U.S. semiconductor do not benefit China. Additionally, given the rising oil and gas prices and the Biden administration’s decision to release some of the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a couple of legislations have been introduced to specifically address potential loopholes in this aspect. On January 9, 2023, Congress introduced H.R.22/S.9 Protecting America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve from China Act to ensure that nothing from the strategic petroleum reserve is sold or exported to China. The House passed the bill by 331 to 97 votes, while the act also received wide bipartisan support in the Senate.
Despite the relatively limited number of bills on national security, the 118th Congress has already discussed and addressed national security (as it relates to China) across a variety of issues. Among the bills that gather momentum in the first few months of the 118th Congress, roughly a quarter covers national security concerns. Among all of the circa 250 China bills proposed, about 30 directly address national security. This relatively low percentage of such bills compared to, for instance, trade and investment, belie China’s central role in the U.S. National Security Strategy and, accordingly, the importance of national security concerns in the legislative agenda on China. Despite the lower quantity, these bills broadly cover issues including both traditional security concerns like responses to emergency incidents and non-traditional security concerns related to economy, technology and “malign” civilian exchanges.
Among the national security concerns that Congress seeks to address, traditional national security concerns still persist and span across a number of areas. For example, the new Congress has sought to learn more about China in the sphere of national defense and military operations: on February 7 and February 8, 2023, respectively, the House Committee on Armed Services held two hearings addressing China’s threat to U.S. national defense and the role of special operations forces in great power competition. Apart from these general inquiries and investigations, Congress proposed roughly 10 bills and a couple of hearings that primarily address traditional national security concerns. Three issues receive special emphasis: China’s global security initiatives and activities, the Taiwan issue, and responses to the ‘Chinese balloon incident’ of early February.
From the national security perspective, the United States sees China as the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order. Accordingly, Congress has given primary focus on China’s presence in and understanding of global security. On January 26, 2023, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) held a one-day hearing on China’s Military Diplomacy and Overseas Security Activities, broadly covering the People’s Liberation Army’s military diplomacy strategy, recent activities, overseas capabilities as well as relevant issues on China’s defense industry development. On March 7, 2023, USCC published an issue brief on China’s security and diplomatic activities in February 2023, addressing China’s Global Security Initiative and the “position paper” by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Ukraine. In the same vein, some lawmakers have sought to give more specific instructions as they seek more information about China’s global security activities. On February 16, 2023, Senator Rick Scott introduced S.520 No CCP (Chinese Communist Police) in the United States Act of 2023, seeking to get more transparency about China’s bilateral security agreements and joint police initiatives. In addition to information-collection, research and analyses, lawmakers have also come to propose legislative direction regarding the United States’ response in specific countries and regions. On February 21, 2023, for example, Rep. John James introduced H.Res.145 to oppose South Africa’s military exercises with China and Russia and to call on the Biden administration for a thorough review of the United States-South Africa relationship. On March 23, 2023, House passed H.R.406 Providing Appropriate Recognition and Treatment Needed to Enhance Relations with ASEAN Act, aiming to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and to prevent the region from having “little choice but to turn to the CCP.”
Where the sensitive issue of Taiwan is concerned, lawmakers continued the efforts of the last Congress to propose and develop possible deterrence measures in case of “aggression by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan” or “a military invasion of Taiwan.” One of the most extreme of these bills, S.477 Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act, was introduced by Senator Rick Scott on February 16, 2023, which would authorize the U.S. President “to use military force for the purpose of securing and defending Taiwan against armed attack.” Alternatively, H.R.2372/S.1027 Sanctions Targeting Aggressors of Neighboring Democracies (STAND) with Taiwan Act of 2023, the most representative among similar bills, proposes to pose sanctions on Chinese leaders, officials and financial institutions should Chinese “aggression” occur. Meanwhile, S.770/H.R.1330 Taiwan Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act, proposed by Senator Marsha Blackburn and Rep Michelle Steel, aims to “strengthen Taiwanese forces” by “authorizing a defense lend or lease program with the Government of Taiwan, in the case of preemptive aggression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”
As an impactful incident affecting the U.S.-China relationship in the first few months of 2023, the spotting of the high-altitude Chinese balloon was followed by legislative responses and reactions. On February 2, 2023, House China Committee Chair Mike Gallagher and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi issued a joint statement on the “suspected CCP spy balloon,” arguing that the incidents demonstrate that China’s “threat” “is not confined to distant shores.” On February 9, 2023, the House agreed to a single-chamber resolution “condemning the Chinese Communist Party’s use of a high-altitude surveillance balloon over United States territory as a brazen violation of United States sovereignty,” calling the incident an “aggression” that “will not be tolerated.” On February 15, 2023, the Senate passed two resolutions on the balloon incident. Echoing the House resolution, both S.Res.66 and S.Res.49 condemn China’s use of the balloon, calling it “a brazen violation of United States sovereignty” and an “unacceptable” “espionage mission,” respectively. Responses to the balloon incident have received overall and bipartisan support in the Congress, and congressional leaders have meanwhile stressed that “national security is not a partisan issue.” Notably, these three resolutions mark more than half of the five China-related bills that were passed in the first four months of the 118th Congress.
In addition to traditional security concerns, lawmakers have also voiced concerns on a number of non-traditional security issues, covering the broad aspects of fields that could be implicated by the U.S.-China competition. Given the importance of trade and investment issues, a great deal of legislative attention has focused on economic security. These concerns could come to incorporate the interests of U.S. allies and partners. For example, S.295/H.R.1135 Countering Economic Coercion Act of 2023 aims to ensure “shared economic and security interests” of the United States and “foreign trading partners” against “economic coercion” from “foreign adversary” by either imposing additional tariffs on “foreign adversary” or providing foreign aid—subject to congressional approval—to injured partners. Given that U.S.-China economic engagements cover a broad range of aspects, legislative concerns about economic security also include several specific issues such as food security, energy security and technology.
Noting the importance of protecting U.S. food security and U.S. agriculture from foreign influence, lawmakers have proposed measures such as restricting Chinese purchase of U.S. farmlands or Chinese access to U.S. biotechnology. As an example, Senator Josh Hawley’s S.684 This Land Is Our Land Act would prohibit Chinese corporations or individuals associated with the Chinese government from owning American farmland, especially when the land is in close proximity to military installations. In a different fashion, H.R.683/S.168 Pass Act, introduced by Rep. Elise Stefanik and Sen. Mike Rounds, would protect U.S. national security and food security by including the Department of Agriculture in the existing review mechanism of foreign investment in the United States to ensure representation of agricultural interests.
Where energy security is concerned, legislative attention has been focused on both fossil fuels and renewable energy. Responding to President Biden’s decision to release part of the United States’ Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), Senator Ted Cruz and Rep. McMorris Rodgers introduced H.R.22/S.9 Protecting America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve from China Act, aiming to pose a legal prohibition on the selling and exporting of SPR oil to China. On renewable energy, H.R.1448 DARE Act of 2023 would defend America’s rural energy production by prohibiting “China and other foreign adversaries” from purchasing American farmland and other land critical to America’s renewable energy and economic security.
Where economic security intersects with emerging technologies and data, S.686 RESTRICT Act aims to “establish a proactive, risk-based, comprehensive mechanism to address discrete and systematic technology-based threats from China and other foreign adversaries” by reviewing and mitigating relevant business transactions under the Department of Commerce.
Given the increasingly complex nature of U.S.-China relationship, some of the non-traditional security concerns are receiving even more congressional and public attention than traditional security concerns. In the first few months of the 118th Congress, for example, more hearings and legislative proposals were directed towards economic security in the field of technology, data and food security. Simultaneously, hearings on issues such as TikTok and information security in general came to attract more media coverage and political momentum than hearings on traditional security concerns.
As another group of emerging non-traditional concerns, Congress is posing increasing scrutiny over non-government, non-military interactions between the U.S. and China to identify and mitigate “malign influence”—namely, when these interactions could potentially have a hidden agenda or indirectly lead to harmful consequences. Depending on the areas of concern, legislative approach to these “malign influence” concerns are threefold. First, bills such as H.R.1398 Protect America’s Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act would propose to establish a special “CCP Initiative” in the U.S. Department of Justice to counter “nation-state threats” and curb “spying and intellectual property thefts.” Second, when former officials were concerned, bills such as S.442 Cutting Off Communist Profiteers Act prohibits American political appointees from working for a Chinese company. Third, concerning funding and ties to higher education and research, the current approach has mostly focused on transparency and disclosure. For example, S.768 Preventing Malign CCP Influence on Academic Institutions Act requires institutions of higher education to disclose certain ties to organizations affiliated with the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, and the People’s Liberation Army.
Sanctions remain the most prominent tool to press China on a variety of critical issues that the United States traditionally or recently has grievances. Among the bills that propose enforceable measures, sanctions are the most favored measure, followed by reporting and information collection duties and screening mechanisms. Depending on the topic and the purpose, sanctions could be posed unilaterally, multilaterally or the list of sanctioned entities could be indirectly used as a point of reference. The targets and nature of the sanctions also vary.
In the 118th Congress, unilateral sanctions have been used to achieve a variety of purposes. Sanctions are most frequently mentioned as a way to deter “Chinese aggression against Taiwan,” though the definition of “aggression” varies across bills. For example, S.481 Deterring Communist Chinese Aggression against Taiwan through Financial Sanctions Act of 2023, introduced by Senator Rick Scott, would authorize sanctions following any “attempt by the Government of the People’s Republic of China” to “subject Taiwan to the control of the People’s Republic of China” through means such as “armed aggression against Taiwan,” “blockading by sea or air” and “attempting to change the status of Taiwan or its government by force or coercive actions.” In comparison, H.R.2372/S.1027 Sanctions Targeting Aggressors of Neighboring Democracies (STAND) with Taiwan Act of 2023 would authorize sanctions only if the President or Congress determines that there is a “military invasion of Taiwan.” Possible targets of sanctions related to Taiwan deterrence could broadly cover specific Chinese officials and personnel, Chinese (state-owned) institutions, financial transactions through Chinese banks or Chinese exports to the United States. Compared to the conditions of sanctions, there is more legislative convergence on the nature and targets of the sanctions that could be imposed once the condition is triggered.
Meanwhile, some other unilateral sanctions on China, especially those related to top Chinese officials, intend to increase pressure on China for specific U.S. policy needs. For example, H.R.1016 would prohibit certain members of the Chinese Communist Party from entering the United States until China “ceases the theft of the intellectual property of the United States.” H.R.1171 Stop CCP Fentanyl Act would sanction top officials of China until it is determined that China has “taken all reasonable measures to prevent the flow of fentanyl produced within the People’s Republic of China into the United States.” Relatedly, sanctions could also be proposed as a way to reinforce or highlight Congress’ commitment to certain positions and policy. H.R.229 World Deserves To Know Act, reintroduced by Rep. Rob Wittman, would sanction certain members of the Chinese Communist Party and relevant officials of Chinese health agencies “in relation to any involvement in the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.” S.591 South China Sea and East China Sea Sanctions Act of 2023 would sanction officials, corporations and personnels involved in Chinese “aggression” in the South China Sea to express congressional “opposition.”
Following the renewed legislative attention to the data security concerns of TikTok and other Chinese tech companies, another group of unilateral sanctions has aimed to terminate the U.S. operations of certain Chinese softwares and social media platforms. For example, H.R.503/S.85 would impose sanctions on TikTok and demand a report on TikTok’s national security threats. More broadly, H.R.57 Protecting Personal Data from Foreign Adversaries Act authorizes the President to sanction software or mobile apps that transfer American user data to China-based servers without authorization or prior notice, with a special focus on the WeChat and TikTok apps.
In comparison to unilateral sanctions, joint sanctions are proposed less frequently and mostly intend to control the outflow of a narrowly defined group of technology. Following the February 2023 balloon incident, Rep. Gregory Meeks introduced H.R.1151, aiming to “hold the People’s Republic of China accountable for the violation of United States airspace and sovereignty with its high-altitude surveillance balloon.” This accountability would be held by sanctioning the Chinese government’s “global surveillance program,” ideally through a “global consensus” with allies and partners. As an extension of the multilateral sanctions on Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine, H.R.1368 Deter PRC Support to the Russian War Effort Act proposes to sanction relevant companies and personnels that provide military support to Russia or help Russia evade multilateral sanctions. During the Senate Banking Committee hearing on February 28, 2023 on sanctions and export controls regime, testifying experts also expressed preference of a multilateral sanction regime for policy objectives such as controlling dual-use technology, achieving strategic trade controls and addressing human rights abuses.
Finally, as an extended and indirect use of sanctions, the list of sanctioned entities could sometimes be used as a reference point for other measures and policies. For example, H.R.749/S.143, introduced by Rep. Claudia Tenney and Sen. Marco Rubio, would prohibit the attribution of federal funds to certain entities currently sanctioned by the United States. Similarly, H.R.401, introduced by Rep. Rick Allen, would prohibit the Director of the National Science Foundation from awarding grants to companies listed as sanctioned “Chinese communist military companies.” In addition to federal funding and grants, S.152 American Financial Markets Integrity and Security Act would also prohibit Chinese companies on the Entity List from accessing U.S. capital markets while H.R.1569 CLAMP Act of 2023 would prohibit the issuance of land and mining licenses to sanctioned Chinese companies, individuals and entities.
Long-standing U.S. concerns on human rights and minority issues in China are still present in the legislative agenda; especially in hearings and official statements. On March 28, 2023, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China held a hearing on “Preserving Tibet: Combating Cultural Erasure, Forced Assimilation and Transnational Repression,” echoing long-time U.S. grievances on the Tibetan issue in China. Similarly, many members of the 118th Congress have previously criticized China for ethnic and religious minority issues, including those reportedly occurring in Xinjiang and Tibet. At the same time, the first few months of the 118th Congress only featured two bills specifically related to traditional human rights issues. S.138/H.R.533 Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act proposes to express a general statement of congressional policy upholding “right to self-determination” of “the Tibetan people” and proposes U.S. Department of State efforts to fight back “disinformation” from China. In a similar manner, S.484 requires the Secretary of Commerce to provide training and guidance relating to human rights abuses, “including such abuses perpetrated against the Uyghur population by the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”
However, the continuing legislative discussions on “human rights” belie a new approach by Congress on this issue; one that focuses on the upholding of democratic values and institutions as a contrast to Beijing’s “authoritarianism” rather than on distinct cases of human rights abuses and minority rights. With the exception of the aforementioned hearings, statements and the two bills, the roughly 20 bills on Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang placed more emphasis on the contest between democracy and autocracy. For bills on Hong Kong, the democratic values concern Hong Kong’s autonomy, democratic institutions and rule of law. S.Res.106, for example, condemns Beijing’s destruction of Hong Kong’s democracy and rule of law, while S.490/H.R.1103 hints at the “high degree of autonomy” that Hong Kong supposedly should enjoy from the People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, when bills such as H.R.1330/S.770 Taiwan Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act advocates for the need to ensure Taiwan’s defense capacity, the sponsors applaud “the brave Taiwanese people” as “a shining example of democracy in the Indo-Pacific—a stark contrast to Xi Jinping’s tyrannical regime that commits gross human rights abuses.” Where Xinjiang is concerned, there is also a subtle shift of focus from specific human rights concerns to the dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian values. S.585/H.R.1324 Uyghur Human Rights Sanctions Review Act proposes to hold Chinese companies responsible for “human rights abuses” against “Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).” Nevertheless, in contrast to minority and religious rights, the targets of the bill are “Chinese surveillance companies” and sponsors of the bill criticize China as a “Stalinist regime.”
Apart from defending democratic values and institutions against authoritarianism or authoritarian interference, the significance of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Xinjiang are also enhanced by their role in the supply chain or capital market. In fact, a majority of bills on Hong Kong and Xinjiang discuss economic issues and implications of the region while some lawmakers have specifically introduced bills to highlight U.S.-Taiwan ties in trade and economy.
On Hong Kong, concerns for and the significance of the special region’s autonomy are enhanced by the economic privileges that are traditionally granted to Hong Kong. For example, S.490/H.R.1103, introduced by Senator Marco Rubio and Rep. Christopher Smith, would require the President to “remove the extension of certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities to the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices if Hong Kong no longer enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the People’s Republic of China.”
On Xinjiang, the discussions of the region’s human rights concerns often land on forced labor and the export restrictions of the supply chain of products that are linked to Xinjiang and, thus, affected by forced labor concerns. Building on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act introduced and passed by the 117th Congress, new bills have focused on the export restriction risks and extended enforcement mechanisms concerning goods and imports from or related to the region. For example, S.864 Transaction and Sourcing Knowledge Act (TASK Act), re-introduced by Senator Rick Scott, would mandate the Securities and Exchange Commission to compel publicly traded companies to disclose information about their supply chains connected to products utilizing forced labor from China’s Xinjiang region as well as require reporting on a company’s sourcing and due diligence activities in Xinjiang, transactions with Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies, and the presence of a Chinese Communist Party committee within a publicly traded company operating in China. According to Senator Scott, the bill aims to increase transparency and hold corporations accountable for any involvement with “slave labor and genocide” and, specifically, “sourcing and due diligence activities involving supply chains of products that are directly linked to Xinjiang.” On another note, S.151 Countering Corporate Corruption in China Act of 2023 seeks to expand the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)—an act that is traditionally linked to business activities of U.S. companies overseas and relevant prohibition of foreign corrupt practices—to include involvement in Xinjiang’s forced labor issues as well as other activities such as Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) propaganda efforts.
Meanwhile, congressional concerns for Taiwan are also enhanced by the need and importance to strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan trade ties due to Taiwan’s important role in critical supply chain sectors. H.Con.Res.10, introduced by Rep. Thomas Tiffany on January 25, 2023, for example, would express “the sense of Congress that the United States should resume normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan” and “initiate formal negotiations with Taiwan on the establishment of a United States-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement.” Similar bills in the 117th Congress emphasized the importance of U.S.-Taiwan economic ties in critical sectors such as agriculture and semiconductor manufacturing. Relatedly, S.Res.91 also expresses the “sense of the Senate” on “the value of a tax agreement with Taiwan.” This Senate resolution highlights that the “United States has ongoing economic dialogues with Taiwan that cover a range of trade, technology, and investment issues through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Council led by the United States Trade Representative, the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue led by the Department of State, and the Technology, Trade, and Investment Collaboration framework led by the Department of Commerce.”
With a total of 14 bills directly addressing the Taiwan issue, the 118th Congress has given Taiwan special focus and emphasis across a number of issues and concerns. Following the intensified tensions surrounding the Taiwan Strait after Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit and with the development of U.S.-China competition, lawmakers have turned to conceptualize and propose a range of possible approaches that Congress could adopt with regard to its Taiwan policy and concerns.
To set or adjust the most basic principle of congressional policy on Taiwan, some lawmakers are considering laws that would shift the United States’ diplomatic policy on Taiwan. Advocating for one of the most extreme kinds of policy changes, Rep. Thomas Tiffany proposed H.Con.Res.10 expresses a “sense of Congress” that the United States should “resume normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement with Taiwan, and support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations.” A step-back from this approach is the idea to keep the possibility open and the policy flexible. H.R.1159, introduced by Rep. Ann Wagner on February 24, 2023, would amend the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 to require periodic reviews and updated reports relating to the Department of State’s Taiwan Guidelines. The latter bill passed the House on March 22, 2023 by 404 to 7 votes.
Echoing aforementioned concerns on national security and the Taiwan issues, lawmakers are contemplating ways to deter “Chinese aggression against Taiwan,” specifically military operations and “armed aggression.” In addition to achieving deterrence through a sanction regime on Chinese leaders, personnels, financial transactions and trade (as was discussed above under section 3), some lawmakers have also hoped to gather more information before imposing specific sanctions. Introduced by Rep. French Hill on January 26, 2023, H.R.554 would require the Secretary of the Treasury to publish a report on financial institutions and accounts connected to senior officials of the People’s Republic of China, in case the United States ever needs to restrict financial services for these officials or their immediate family members. Other lawmakers have sought to deter China by bringing in the possibility of U.S. military intervention. Introduced by Senator Rick Scott, S.477 Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act would “authorize the President to use military force for the purpose of securing and defending Taiwan against armed attack.”
Additionally, a couple of ideas have been proposed to enhance the defense capabilities of Taiwan. S.770 Taiwan Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act seeks to increase Taiwan’s capability to defend itself “against an invasion from Communist China” by providing for the “loan and lease” of military equipment. During the February 9, 2023 hearing in front of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, ranking member Jim Risch has also questioned United States Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman for “a prioritized list of Taiwan’s military needs,” likely to facilitate congressional deliberations on the military support to be further extended to Taiwan. Relatedly, H.R.1127 would authorize cooperation between the Department of Homeland Security and Taiwan to strengthen Taiwan’s preparedness against cyber threats and enhance capabilities in cybersecurity.
In cases of “aggression” short of military nature, Rep. Frank Lucas has proposed to exclude China from certain multilateral organizations. Under H.R.803, introduced by Rep. Lucas on February 2, 2023, if the President informs Congress that actions by China pose “any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom,” the President will be authorized to direct the exclusion of China’s representatives from multilateral organizations. This list of organizations includes the G20, the Bank for International Settlements, the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
Finally, Congress is also considering increasing support for international recognition of Taiwan. This could be achieved by supporting Taiwan for playing a greater role in international organizations. H.R.1151, for example, includes provisions that would require the Secretary of State to develop a strategy that would include supporting Taiwan’s participation in the events and meetings of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The bill passed the House on April 17, 2023, with the aforementioned provisions included in the final version. Similarly, H.R.540 would require the Secretary of the Treasury to “pursue more equitable treatment of Taiwan at the international financial institutions.” In comparison, a milder position has also been mentioned to simply oppose changes to the existing status-quo within international organizations. For example, H.R.1176 would establish the U.S. position that the United States, as a member of any international organizations, should oppose any attempts by the People’s Republic of China to resolve Taiwan’s status by distorting the decisions, language, policies, or procedures of the organization, and for other purposes.
The 118th Congress has also developed increasing concerns about China’s influence and presence in multilateral and regional platforms and rulemaking. In the first few months of the 118th Congress, discussions on China’s global influence included a full-day hearing in the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, two hearings at the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee and the introduction of nine bills. These legislative discussions covered China’s influence in the international system, in emerging fields and in specific regions. They also debated and evaluated possible preventative measures to counter China’s growing role in these areas.
Noting the possibility that China would take an expanded role in the international system, U.S. lawmakers have expressed concerns and called for preemptive measures, especially where the international financial system is concerned. With regard to China’s role at the International Monetary Fund, two bills have been proposed to prevent China from getting more voting rights. H.R.510 Chinese Currency Accountability Act of 2023 would require the United States representatives at the International Monetary Fund to oppose an increase in the weight of the Chinese renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights basket of the Fund. Similarly, H.R.605 would increase congressional oversight with respect to the allocations of Special Drawing Rights by the International Monetary Fund, and would prohibit “perpetrators of genocide and state sponsors of terrorism” from getting more voting rights absent congressional approval. Meanwhile, some lawmakers have also expressed concerns about China’s challenge to the dollar. S.Res.87/H.Res.190, introduced at both chambers of Congress, expressed concerns about China and the European Union’s attempt to “develop alternative payment systems to weaken the dominant position of the United States dollar as a reserve currency.”
Meanwhile, lawmakers are also cautious about ensuring U.S. leadership against China’s influence, especially in strategically important fields and regions. For example, S.Res.155/H.Res.270 Resolution to Promote the U.S. Digital Economy and Digital Trade notes that digital trade is “becoming the new frontier in economic strength” and calls for the U.S. to “prioritize” digital governance “to shape regional norms and provide an alternative to restrictive policies promoted by our adversaries like China,” calling on “American leadership on digital trade rules.” Concerned about China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific and urging for greater ties between the United States and ASEAN countries, Rep. Joaquin Castro, sponsor of H.R.406 Providing Appropriate Recognition and Treatment Needed to Enhance Relations with ASEAN Act, noted: “Without meaningful engagement, we leave the region little choice but to turn to the CCP.” Rep. Castro accordingly calls for further work to ensure U.S. leadership in the region to ensure “freedom and sovereignty prevail,” both regionally and globally.
Additionally, hearings from the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission also focused on the consolidation and expansion of Chinese ties in specific countries and regions. Specifically, testifying experts have warned against China’s attempts to establish more favorable relationships with ‘Five Eyes’ countries by cultivating ties with politicians and elites, strengthening cultural awareness and, thus, “soft power” and extending business ties. Alternatively and echoing long-term U.S. observations, witnesses have also highlighted China’s financial and economic ties with developing countries; particularly those in the Pacific Islands, Africa and Latin America and through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Lawmakers and congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle have been vocal about their discontent towards the Biden administration for its lack of transparency and of congressional consultation. Within the first few months, lawmakers have introduced 10 bills demanding for more information from government agencies, 8 bills that involve congressional oversight provisions and 9 bills that directly address the internal organization and administrative rules of departments and agencies.
Although complaints about the lack of information were relayed in the 117th Congress, the legislative call for transparency became especially pronounced after the balloon incident. On February 1, 2023, a high-altitude balloon of Chinese origin was spotted over Billings, Montana, leading to strong public and legislative reactions. Although lawmakers received at least two classified briefings on February 9, 2023 and February 15, 2023, Congress continued to openly call on the Biden administration to keep Congress in the loop. All three resolutions in response to the balloon incident directly and explicitly addressed the issue of transparency with regard to the administration. H.Res.104, which passed the House on February 9, 2023, calls on the Biden administration to continue to keep Congress apprised by providing comprehensive briefings on this incident. S.Res.66, which passed the Senate on February 15, 2023, calls on the President to “keep Congress fully informed.” Both resolutions included a detailed item list of specific reports and information that Congress requires of the administration, including a timeline of the balloon incident, similar incidents in the past, as well as a full recounting and explanation of the administration’s reactions and countermeasures. Similarly, S.Res.49, which passed the Senate on February 15, 2023, “calls on the President to be transparent with the American people and Congress regarding this latest spying incident and all other attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to conduct surveillance on United States citizens, territory, and assets.”
Congressional response to the balloon incident echoes broader demand of information and data about China, especially in the field of finance and economy. Where the financial market is concerned, S.970 Documenting Adversarial Trade Aggression Act or the DATA Act asks the Department of Commerce to establish a new China Economic Data Coordination Center to consolidate data on China’s economy and financial markets to understand China’s “economic health” and “expose risks for U.S. companies in China.” H.R.1156 China Financial Threat Mitigation Act of 2023 asks the administration to report on the exposure of the United States to the financial sector of the People’s Republic of China. Alternatively, other bills propose to increase transparency and awareness in the financial sector by creating new disclosure requirements to be implemented by U.S. agencies. For example, bills have been introduced in both the House and the Senate to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to require public companies to disclose investments to and business transactions with China and Chinese companies. Additionally, given the interconnectedness of the U.S. and China, some lawmakers are also concerned about unknown incidents that federal funding flows to China. As such, H.R.551 No Taxpayer Funding for the Chinese Communist Party Act of 2023 directs the Attorney General to report to Congress on how United States taxpayer-funded research could have benefited China. Similarly, H.R.1025/S.421 includes provisions requiring a GAO study regarding Federal funds previously provided to Chinese institutions that could be related to the origin of the COVID-19 origin.
Although on a smaller scale, legislative concerns for government transparency and lack of information have also naturally covered the field of national security. During the February 9, 2023 hearing in front of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on Evaluating U.S.-China Policy, committee ranking member Jim Risch openly criticized the administration for not responding to the committee’s request for a prioritized list of Taiwan’s military needs despite repeated urgings. Senator Mitt Romney similarly reminded the State Department that last year’s National Defense Authorization Act requires a comprehensive strategy to address the threat of an emerging China and urges swift completion of the obligation. Additionally, Senator Rick Scott introduced S.520 No CCP (Chinese Communist Police) in the United States Act of 2023 on February 16, 2023. The bill would directly demand more information about China’s bilateral security agreements and joint police initiatives.
In addition to concerns about transparency and lack of information, lawmakers have also voiced criticism about the lack of congressional consultation in the area of foreign policy and commerce. During the February 9, 2023 hearing on Evaluating U.S.-China Policy, Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Bob Menandez urged the government to make Congress “an active partner” for U.S. diplomacy and development in the Indo-Pacific, while Ranking Member Jim Risch openly expressed concerns that “the administration still does not consider Congress a true partner on China.” Similarly, Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Mike Crapo has also noted the administration’s “insufficient consultation with Congress” on U.S. trade policy, echoing earlier congressional grievances towards the lack of congressional consultation ahead of negotiations such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework.
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic national emergency slowing approaching its end, in the first few months of the 118th Congress, more than a dozen bills were introduced that specifically address the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic and its possible connection to China as well as the Wuhan Institute of Virology. This number is higher than the number of bills that primarily address human rights (10 bills) and roughly the same as those on Taiwan (14 bills). Most notably, the COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 unanimously passed both chambers of Congress and became law on March 20, 2023. The bill requires the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to declassify all information relating to potential links between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and the origin of COVID-19 and to submit to Congress an unclassified report on possible COVID-19 origin. According to China Committee Chair Mike Gallagher, the Biden administration “had it within its authority to declassify all the relevant intelligence surrounding COVID” and provide the American people with answers of COVID-19 origin, “but they have repeatedly refused to take this easy but important step.” As such, Congress is “finally” taking steps to “force [the administration’s] hand” “in overwhelming bipartisan fashion” by passing the act.
In addition to bills on transparency and disclosure, lawmakers have also proposed legislations that would impose sanctions on the supposed connection between certain Chinese officials and COVID-19 (e.g., H.R.229 World Deserves To Know Act) on demanding financial compensations from China by an amount ranging from 4.6 to 16 trillion dollars (H.Res.9, H.Res.186 and H.R. 566 China Lied People Died Act) and on the prohibition of federal funding to U.S. organizations with alleged ties of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (H.R.494/S.84 To prohibit Federal funding to EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.). Despite the number of the bills on this subject, they seem to mostly concern political messaging and the position of individual lawmakers. As such, no foreign implications are yet observed from the legislative agenda on COVID-19 origin.
While tempting, it is difficult to honestly call the 118th Congress entirely ‘anti-China.’ Most legislative processing concerning China still has a heavy focus on domestic or internal policy, and China—or the strategic competition with China—is primarily being used as a reason or motivation to reform or transform domestic U.S. policy. Setting aside legislative proposals intended to raise awareness, initiate policy discussions or make political messaging, many of the China-related bills introduced within the first four months of the 118th Congress do not address direct U.S.-China ties or bilateral engagements. Instead, lawmakers have focused on strengthening domestic U.S. policy or adjusting U.S. foreign policy with allies and partners as important means to counter China and ensure U.S. leadership. Where trade and China are concerned, for example, the primary legislative focus has shifted from traditional grievances towards China’s practices (e.g., intellectual property and antidumping) to policies that indirectly respond to the competition with China (e.g., enhancing U.S. domestic manufacturing and private sector research or adjusting administrative policy to strengthen partnership with allies and partners).
That being said, anti-China rhetorics have persisted in Washington, and the bilateral relationship has deteriorated significantly since the beginning of the Biden administration despite recent efforts. Accordingly,proposed legislative policies on the competition with China can often be turbocharged by the hysterical and hostile voices against China; especially when it comes to bills targeting specific areas or fields. Legislatures appear to be more open and willing than ever before to explicitly point a finger with China at the other end. On trade, legislative calls for ending China’s permanent normal trade relations status reached a new high. On investment, legislators introduced a package of bills “urging both federal agencies and private businesses to decouple operations and investments” from China. On national security, some lawmakers would authorize usage of military force to “secure and defend Taiwan” in addition to sanction deterrence. In contrast to the Biden administration, which has promised to seek and ‘thaw’ the U.S.-China relationship, the congressional trajectory on China does not appear to have changed.
So far, the 118th Congress has not yet put out a comprehensive and sophisticated approach to deal with China. Understandably, it is rather difficult to expect this Congress to build up a detailed framework in this regard: while both sides of the aisle share a common understanding of the importance of China and the issues related to China, there is no notable in-depth agreement beyond that level. Belying the general consensus to compete with China, some Republicans seemed to have a renewed focus on expanding trade in friendly or emerging markets, whereas Senate Democratic leadership is continuing to push for provisions that did not make it into the final China competition bill passed in the 117thCongress; namely, outbound investment screening, tightened sanctions and stronger commitment to “strategic alliances” in the Indo-Pacific.
Looking forward, with the 2024 election approaching, it is unclear how much the 118th Congress can tangibly do to significantly transform or solidify the current trajectory of the U.S.-China relationship through legislation. In the first six months of 2023, only five bills made it to their final legislative stages: the House resolution on establishing the Select Committee on China (H.Res.11), three single-chamber resolutions in response to the balloon incident (H.Res.104, S.Res.66 and S.Res.49), and COVID-19 Origin Act of 2023 (S.619). Given the current state of turmoil in U.S.-China relations and upcoming political season, it is uncertain whether and how soon other bills related to China could move forward to become legally effective.
This period of entrance into sensitive times leaves the 118th Congress with an array of ‘hot topics’—Taiwan, the South China Sea, further development of the balloon incidents, COVID-19 origin, trade, tariffs, sanctions, and whatever new incidents may happen—hanging on the edge legislatively. The 118th Congress could very much be trapped in a cycle of reaction and response to the emerging crises or explosive news between the U.S. and China and, therefore, become even more incapable of actively pushing out sophisticated frameworks to reshape or redefine the trajectory of the U.S.-China competition. The outbreak of the balloon incident, for example, coincides with the announcement of two China-related statements by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Menendez; the first which urged the administration to establish effective communication channels between Washington and Beijing on climate, fentanyl and crisis communications on February 2, 2023, and the second which called for full resourcing and a coordinated government approach to bolster U.S. involvement in the Indo-Pacific on February 9, 2023. It is yet to be seen whether any of the statements would lead to further policy progress and whether similar dilemmas could be avoided if Congress manages to develop a proactive action plan in case of possible escalation or new tensions in the bilateral relationship. Either way, the 118th Congress should think ahead and plan accordingly as it looks into new ways to address the U.S-China relationship and engage U.S. foreign policy.
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